Geanakoplos [14] dened a notion of bargaining set, and proved that his bargaining set is approximately c ompetitive i n large nite transferable utility (TU) exchange economies with smooth preferences. Shapley and Shubik [20] showed that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive i n replica sequences o f T U e x c hange economies with smooth preferences. We extend Geanakoplos' result to nontransferable utility ( N TU) exchange economies without smooth preferences, and we e x tend the Shapley and Shubik result to non-replica sequences of NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences.
Introduction
The bargaining set w as originally d e ned by Aumann and Maschler [6] . Several dierent d e nitions have b e e n subsequently proposed; the most frequently used denition was proposed b y D a vis and Maschler [8] . In the exchange economy c ontext we c onsider here, the core consis t s o f a l l a l locations such that no coalition can propose an alternative s e t of trades which i s feasible f or the coalition on its own and which m akes a l l o f i ts members better o. All d e nitions of the bargaining set restrict the ability of coalitions to b l ock (\object to") an allocation, by t a k ing into account the possibility that a second coalition might propose yet another set of trades (\counterob-ject") and thereby cause some m embers to defect from the rst coalition. In the Aumann-Maschler and Davis-Maschler denitions, the original objection is proposed b y a \leader;" any c ounterobjecting coalition must exclude this leader.
Geanakoplos [14] considered sequences of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. He modied the Davis-Maschler denition so that the \leader" was a group of agents containing a xed (but small) fraction of the number of agents in the economy; t h us, as the number of agents grew along the sequence o f e conomies, the numb e r o f i ndividuals in the \leader" grew proportionately. H e showed that this Geanakoplos bargaining set becomes asymptotically competitive as the numb e r o f a g e n t s grows; the proof, which uses Nonstandard Analysis, is quite lengthy.
In Section 3, we present t w o theorems showing that the Geanakoplos bargaining set is approximately competitive i n large nite NTU exchange economies. In addition to dropping the assumption of transferable utility, we weaken certain other assumptions (notably s m oothness of preferences) required in Geanakoplos [14] . The rst theorem (Theorem 3.4) requires assumptions similar to those needed for certain core convergence results (see Anderson [4] ); no rate of convergence is established. The hypotheses of the second theorem (Theorem 3.6) are incomparable to those of the rst. The main additional hypothesis in the second theorem is that a positive fraction of the agents have uniformly bounded m arginal zero. The second theorem includes a rate of conve arbitrarily c l ose to the inverse of the numb e r o f a g e n ts. Both theorems are derived from Proposition 3.10.
Mas-Colell [19] considered exchange economies with a continuum of agents but without transferable utility o r s m ooth preferences. He proposed a denition of the bargaining set which d o e s not involve the concept of a leader. Under hypotheses similar to those of Aumann's c o r e e q uivalence theorem, h e showed that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the set o f W alrasian allocations. Since m odels w i t h a c ontinuum of agents are thought of as idealizations of large economies, it seemed reasonable to expect that Mas-Colell's bargaining set w ould become approximately c ompetitive in sequZ hou [5] show that Mas-Colell's ba competitive in large nite exchange economies.
The proof of our main Proposition 3.10 is an adaptation of Mas-Colell's equivalence proof. The error terms that arise from substituting the ShapleyFolkman Theorem for Richter's Theorem can be absorbed in the Geanakoplos leaders' consumption at the objection, but they are sucient to destroy the Mas-Colell objection.
Finally, we apply our convergence argument to sequences of economies with smooth preferences. Anderson [3] , K i m [16] and Geller [ 15] have previously shown that economies with smooth preferences exhibit faster core convergence rates than non-smooth economies. In the bargaining set context, the rate of convergence is expressed in t e rms of the size o f t he competitive gap and the size of the leader set. The faster convergence aorded b y s m o o thness allows us to restrict the leader set to be a single individual, and thereby obtain a c onvergence theorem for the Aumann-Davis-Maschler b a rgaining set. Shapley and Shubik [20] had previously shown that the AumannDavis-Maschler bargaininnot in the Mas-Colell bargaining set tends to zero. It is remarkable that the designation of a single l e ader should make such a profound dierence in the resulting bargaining set.
Smoothness of preferences is a strong assumption because it requires that indierence surfaces not cut the boundary of the consumption set; in particular, it implies that at every Walrasian equilibrium, a l l agents with positive income consume positive a m ounts of all goods. It may be possible t o w e aken smoothness to a linkedness condition, as in Cheng [7] , Propositions 7.4.12 and 7.4.16 of Mas-Colell [18] , and Kim [16] .
Preliminaries
We begin with some notation and denitions which w i ll be used throughout. Let P denote the set of preferences. If 2 P , dene x y if x 6 y and y 6 x, x y if x y or x y. N ote that the indierence relation x y is dened from the underlying strict preference relation x y, and is not one of the primitives of the specication of the economy. F or some purposes, we will need additional assumptions on preferences: Let P mo = f2 P : satises 5 a g P ss = f2 P : satises 5bg P sc = f2 P : satises 6g:
(1)
A set P P ss is said to be equisemismooth if, for every compact K R k ++ , inff x : x 2 K; 2 Pg > 0.
An exchange economy is a m ap : A ! P 2 R k + ; w here A is a nite set. For a 2 A; let a denote the preference of a (i.e. the projection of (a) onto P) and e(a) the initial endowment o f a (i.e. the projection of (a) o n to A price p is a n e l ement o f R (; e )) = jp 1 (x 0 e)j +jinffp 1 (y 0 x) : y x gj: Note that, i f is continuous and p 0; then (p; x; (;e ) ) = 0 i m plies that x is in the demand set at price p of an agent with characteristics ( ; e ). gives a quantitative m e asurement of the extent t o w h i c h x fails to satisfy the denition of demand. By a s l i ght abuse of notation, we let (p;f;a) = ( p;f(a);( a ;e(a))) i f f i s a n allocation, and (p; x; a) = ( p; x; ( a ; e ( a ))) if x The Davis-Maschler denition (and implicitly, the Aumann-Maschler denition) of the bargaining set require that an objection be put forward by a leader, a n i ndividual who proposes the objection. A counterobjecting coalition is then r e quired to exclude the leader. Geanakoplos modied this denition to require that an objection be proposed b y a group of leaders, none of whom can be included i n a counterobjecting coalition. 
with strict preference for at least one agent a. A -objection is justied if there is no counterobjection. f is in the -bargaining set, denoted B (), if every -objection to f has a counterobjection. 1 We will present t w o m ain c onvergence theorems; the hypotheses of the theorems are incomparable, while the conclusions of the second theorem are stronger than the conclusions of the rst. In the rst (Theorem 3.4), preferences are assumed to be strongly m onotone and tight, i.e. for every > 0, 1 It may be natural to impose additional restrictions on counterobjections. Zhou [22] has proposed adding three restrictions: T \ S 6 = ;; T 6 S; and S 6 T . The third of these conditions is automatically satised provided U 6 = ;. Note that imposing additional restrictions on counterobjections makes it easier to propose a justied objection, and thus makes the bargaining set smaller. Thus, the convergence results in this paper would still apply i f Z h o u's additional restrictions were imposed.
there is a compact set K of strongly monotone preferences such that the proportion of agents with preferences in K is at least 10. Note that a compact set of strongly monotone preferences is e quimonotone (see Anderson [4] ). This rst theorem also requires uniformly integrable endowments, though it does not require that the social endowment o f e ach good be bounded away from 0. It establishes no rate of convergence. The second theorem (Theorem 3.6) assumes that there is a set P of preferences exhibiting bounded marginal rates of substitution such that the proportion of agents with preferences in P is bounded away from 0. Instead of uniform i n tegrability of endowments, we o n l y require that the largest individual endowment b e s m all compared to the numb e r o f a g e n ts; however, we do require that the per capita social endowment be bounded a w a y from 0 in each commodity. In the event t h a t e n d o wments are uniformly bounded, the rate of convergence is arbitrarily close to the inverse of the numb e r o f a g e n ts. The essence of the proof of both theorems i s c o n tained i n a m ain proposition (Proposition 3.10), which analyzes a xed nite economy. The proof of this proposition is conceptually the same as M as-Colell's proof in the continuum case, with the Shapley-Folkman Theorem substituting for Richter's Theorem; h o w ever, the derivation of the needed e stimates is quite complex. The derivation of the second theorem from Proposition 3.10 is quite straightforward, while the derivation of the rst theorem i s s o m ewhat indirect. 
Our results establish bounds on L(p;f) when f is in the bargaining set. Their signicance comes from the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 Given an allocation f,
Proof: This is contained in the proof of Theorem 1 of Anderson [1] . 
is a sequence o f e c onomies satisfying the following conditions:
1. jA n j ! 1;
2. e n is uniformly integrable, i.e.
jS n j jA n j ! 0 =) 1
e n (a) ! 0; (7) and 3. for all > 0 , there i s a c ompact 2 set K P mo such that jfa 2 A n : a 2 Kgj
Then there exists n ! 0 such that for all f n 2 B n ( n ) 9 p n 2 1 0 such that L(p n ; f n ) jA n j ! 0:
Suppose n satises Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and in addition supfke n (a)k 1 : a 2 A n ; n 2 N g < 1 ; : (12) Then Equation (9) (under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6) and Equation (11) (under Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6) hold for all sequences n such that n jA n j ! 1. Denition 3. 5 We s a y that a set P P m o exhibits bounded m arginal rates of substitution if
Note that if P exhibits bounded marginal rates of substitution, there exists a c ompact set K such that P K P mo . 
1. jA n j ! 1; supfke n (a)k 1 : a 2 A n ; n 2 N g < 1 ; :
Then Equation (18) holds for all sequences n such that n jA n j ! 1 . Moreover, given any sequence J n ! 1 , there exists n ! 0 such that
We need rst to prove t w o lemmas.
Lemma 3 . 7 Suppose there i s a c ompact set K (P mo [ P s s ) 2 R k + , a sequence p n 2 1 0 with p n ! p 2 1 n 1 0 , a n d a s e quence of characteristics ( n ; e n ) 2 K such that inf p n 1e n > 0. Then inffkxk 1 : x 2 D(p n ; n ; e n ) g ! 1
as n ! 1 .
Proof: If the conclusion is false, we can nd a subsequence such t h a t n ! 2 ( P mo [ P ss ), e n ! e 2 R k + , and there exists x n 2 D(p n ; n ;e n ) with x n ! x 2 R 
where D is the demand as dened in section 2. Thus, I(p;a) is the minimum income n e eded for a to achieve the utility l evel of f (a . T h e n there exis t s a n e ighborhood V of p and > 0 such that q 2 V ) minfp 1 ; 1 1 1 p k g . If ( t ; x ) 2 a ( q )f o r some q 2 V , w e h a v e t 2 f 0 ; 1 g , q 1 x 0 and x 0 P a 2 A e ( a ). Accordingly, there is a compact set K containing [ q2V a (q). Therefore, it suces to show that a has closed graph at p. A ccordingly, suppose that p n ! p, ( t n ; x n )2 a ( p n ), and (t n ; x n )!x . Note that if a 6 2 B(p), then a 6 2 B(p n ) for n suciently large; and if a 2 A(p), then a 2 A(p n ) for n suciently large. 
By taking a subsequence, we m a y assume without loss of generality that ni ! 0i , t nia ! t 0ia , and x nia ! x 0ia as n ! 1 . S i nce (t 0ia ; x 0ia ) 2 a (p) for each i 2 f 1 ; : : : ; k gand each a 2 A; moreover, P a2A t 0ia = m for each i and a. Therefore, letting (40) Let (m; x n ) 2 0(p n ). Then m = P a2A t na and x n = P a2A x na with (t na ; x n a ) 2 a ( p n ).
i. Choose a sequence a n with t na n = 0 and L(p n ; a n ) L ( p n ; a ) for all a with t na = 0 : (41) A. If there is a subsequence p n i such that L(p n i ; a n i )!0, then L(p n i ) = P a2A L(p n i ; a) P a2A t n i a L(p n i ; a) + (jAj 0 m ) L ( p n i ; a n i ) P a 2 A t n i a p n i 1 e ( a ) + j A j L ( p n i ; a n i ) M m + 1
for n suciently large, which e stablishes Equation (33).
B. If there exists > 0 such that L(p n ; a n ) for all n, then p n 1e(a n ) for all n. Since L(p n ; a n ) > 0, D(p n ; a n ) a n f ( a n ) ; s i n ce t na n = 0, x na n 2 D(p n ; a n ) 0e(a n ). Since a n comes from the nite family f a : a 2 Ag ( P mo [ P ss ) and p n 1 e(a n ) , m i n fkxk 1 : x 2 D(p n ; a n ) g ! 1 b y Lemma 3 . ii. Suppose Equation (35) is s a t ised. Find P which e x hibits bounded m arginal rates of substitution (with constant ) a n d > , > 0, such that 8i jfa 2 A : e(a) i > ; a 2 P gj jAj 
If a 2 S n , y n = f(a) + y n 0 f ( a ) a f ( a ), since ky n k 1 = M > kf(a)k 1 . T h e refore, if a 2 S n , D(p n ; a ) a f ( a ) and t na = 0 , s o x na 2 D(p n ; a ) 0e ( a ). Therefore, by L e m m a 3.8. Note that the rate depends only o n , , P , a n d 
We need to show that g(a) a f(a) for all a 2 S, w i th strict preference for some a 2 S. W e n e ed to consider two cases: A. 
Therefore,
by Equation (57), establishing Equation (34) 
Notice further that if A ssumptio n 6 i s s a t i sed, then Equation (84) is satised for any sequence n such that n jA n j ! 1. Suppose we are given n such that Equation (84) is satised and f n 2 B n ( n ).
1. If n 6 ! 0, we can choose 
2. Let p n be chosen with respect to f n as in Proposition 3.10. We s a y L ( p n ; f n ; 1 ) converges to 0 in measure if 8 > 0 jfa 2 A n : L(p n ; f n ; a ) > gj jA n j ! 0:
There are two cases to consider:
(a) If L(p n ; f n ; 1 ) d o e s c o n v erge to 0 in measure, then since L(p n ; f n ; a ) p n 1 e n ( a ) k e n ( a ) k 1 is uniformly i n tegrable, L(p n ; f n ; 1 ) c onverges to 0 in mean, i.e. P a2An L(p n ; f n ; a) jA n j ! 0;
which e stablishes Equation (9).
(b) If L(p n ; f n ; 1 ) d o e s not converge to 0 in measure, we will use Proposition 3.10 to derive a c ontradiction. There exists > 0 such t h a t j f a 2 A n : L ( p n ; f n ; a )> gj jA n j > 4
for innitely m any n; b y taking a subsequence, we m a y assume without loss of generality that Equation (88) 
where (t na ; x n a )2 a ( p n ) and P a2An t na n jA n j. S i nce the endowments are uniformly i n tegrable, there exists M such that for all n, 1 jA n j k 
There is a compact set K P mo such that the following inequalities hold for suciently large n:
jfa2A n : L(p n ;f n ;a)>gj of Anderson [2] shows that for any s e quence (f n ; p n )2 A ( n ) 2 D satisfying Equation (18), (f n ; p n ) s a t i ses Equation (20). 
Since M k+1 n is bounded, C pn is bounded away f r om 0, and J n ! 1, i t follows that n ! 0, and n jA n j ! 1 . I t f o l lows from Equation ( This motivated Geanakoplos to consider leader sets of small positive measure as the appropriate extension of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set to continuum games. However, in the nonstandard hypernite games considered by Geanakoplos (as well, of course, in large nite games ) , a n i ndividual leader makes sense. What is surprising is that, given smooth preferences, an individual leader m akes a dierence. In the light of the nonconvergence example for the Mas-Colell bargaining set i n A nderson, Trockel and Zhou [5] , which s a t i ses a l l the assumptions of Theorem 4.4, we see that allowing a single leader can shrink the bargaining set from essentially every individually r at i onal Pareto optimal allocation to a set of allocations which are approximately competitive. There appea r s t o b e n o w a y t o c apture the importance of a single leader i n a continuum model.
2. The leaders i n an Aumann-Davis-Maschler or Geanakoplos objection play a coordinating role. An allocation not in the core may y et emerge from a bargaining process because a coalition which can object to it does not form, e ither because the members of the coaltion are unaware that it is feasible for them to object, or because the members of the coalition cannot agree on how to divide the surplus available to them from objecting. A leader's lot is not a happy one. In the proof of convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets, the leaders achieve the same utility at the objection g as at the prevailing allocation f . By sacricing their interests in d i viding the surplus to be gained by o b j ecting, the leaders enhance the welfare of the remaining members of the objecting coalition, thus immunizing these non-leaders from the blandishments of a counterobjection. Moreover, the leaders precommit not to join a c ounterobjection, even if i t w ould be in their interests to do so; in eect, like the signers of the American Declaration of Independence, the leaders pledge their \ l ives, fortunes and sacred honors" to the principle that the prevailing allocation is unfair. This c r eates a s e rious free rider problem; e a c h player in the potential objecting coalition would prefer to have other people assume the leadership role. Given the dubious benets of becoming a leader, a justied objection with a few leaders (or better yet, just one leader) seems i nherently m ore likely t o f orm than one requiring many leaders, even if t h e m any l e aders represent a s m all fraction of the population. Any unmodeled benet of leadership (such a s p o p u l ar acclaim) will l ikely be greater to each l e ader if the numFor these reasons, the Geanakoplos bargaini too small as a positive solution concept for the bargaining problem, a n d establishing convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is desirable. (e) Since (t n ; x n )20(p n ), there exists g n : A n ! R k + and t n : A ! f0;1g such that P a2An g n (a) 0 e n (a) = x n and P a2An t n (a) = 1 . L e t S n = f a 2 A n : g n ( a ) 6 = e ( a ) g , and n (a) = fy 2 R k + : y a g n (a)g for a 2 S n , and0 n = P a2Snn (a). Item 4 of the proof of Proposition 3.10 shows that there is no y in0 n with y 0. (f) jS n j> r n . Let S n = fa 2 S n : ( a ; e n ( a )) 2 P 2 K; t n (a) = 0 g :
Then jŜ n j > r n 0 j f a 2 A n : ( a ; e n ( a )) 6 2 P 2 Kgj 0 1 ! 1 : (121) Lemma 3.6 of Anderson [3] shows that p n 1 z n 0 jx n j 
If a 2Ŝ n , g n (a) = D ( p n ; a ) a e n ( a ), and p n 1 g n (a) p n 1 e n (a), so g n (a) 2 fy 2 R k + : 9 2 P 9e 2 K y e ; k y k 1 s u p n C p n s u p f k x k 1 : x 2 K g g 3. The proof of Theorem 3 of Anderson [2] shows that for any sequence (f n ; p n ) 2 A ( n ) 2 D satisfying Equation (110), (f n ; p n ) s a t i ses Equation (111).
8 See footnote 7 for further details.
